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While the enduring issues of political union in Europe and political disunion 
in the former Soviet Union point to the traditional importance of these regions, 
analysts of world politics would be well advised to maintain a strong interest in the 
Persian Gulf region. Its geographic position as a bridgehead between three conti-
nents, its vital importance to the functioning of the global economy, and its potential 
volatility make it one of the more significant regions in world politics as we 
approach the turn of the century. 
The Persian Gulf has seen more inter-state and low-intensity conflict in the 
past fifteen years than perhaps any other area in the world. The 1978-79 Iranian 
Revolution, the 1979-89 Soviet intervention in nearby Afghanistan, the nearly 
decade-long Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), and the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war created 
dramatic consequences for the regional and international politics of this area. 
This article focuses on how these conflicts affected one of the increasingly 
more important actors in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia. In particular, it argues that 
regional conflict put in motion short- and long-term effects that significantly 
elevated the power and position of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East from 1978-79 
to 1994. The rise of Saudi power is not only important in and of itself, but has several 
broader implications for the regional and international politics of the region. They 
will be discussed in the conclusion after the argument of this article is developed. 
The thesis that Saudi power has increased over time raises a prior and more 
general question. Since it is difficult to measure power in any clear-cut manner, how 
can one assess changes in Saudi power? This article aims to do so by tracing changes 
in five broad indicators of Saudi power: internal threats to Saudi security, external 
threats to Saudi security, Saudi military capability, the strength of US-Saudi 
relations, and Saudi economic vitality. These military', economic, and political 
indicators, examined in the body of this article, are intended to provide a composite 
picture of Saudi power. 
THE DECREASE IN EXTERNAL THREATS TO SAUDI INTERESTS 
Power is commonly measured either in terms of the actual capabilities of an 
actor or in terms of the actor's ability to influence others or to bring about desired 
outcomes. But regardless of how one measures power in world politics, it is safe 
to say that a state which faces a higher level of threat from other states is less 
powerful than one which faces a lower level of threat, all other things being equal. 
This is because real or perceived threats to a state usually decrease its leverage, place 
constraints on its foreign policy, and tie up its human and material resources. 
Thus, they reduce its ability to bring about desired outcomes. Employing this 
argument, it is fair to say that if threats to Saudi interests decreased from 1978-
79 to 1994, then Saudi power increased. This section attempts to show why and 
how this was the case. 
In 1978-79, the Saudis faced a number of external threats. First, the USSR 
substantially enhanced its influence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) and in Ethiopia, which the Saudis interpreted as a long-term communist 
design to encircle their country.' Second, Saudi Arabia was confronted with the rise 
of the Arab rejectionist front composed of hard-line Arab states such as Syria and 
Libya. These states pressured the Saudis into adopting a less moderate foreign 
policy and into distancing themselves from the United States.2
Third, although Saudi Arabia had been concerned with Iran's increasing 
military strength and regional ambition prior to the Iranian Revolution, it still shared 
with Iran an interest in preserving the status quo. Thus, Riyadh cooperated with Iran 
tacitly under the Nixon administration's "twin pillar"3 policy. The Iranian 
Revolution, however, undermined this policy and put Saudi-Iranian relations on a 
downward path. 
Fourth, to worsen matters, the fall of the Shah created an opportunity for 
Iraq's Saddam Hussein to assume the mantle of Gulf leadership. Iraq's influence 
over Saudi Arabia increased from 1978 to mid-late 1979,4 which further limited 
Saudi action. Though the Saudis feared Iraq less than they did Iran under Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Iraq was still viewed by them as a military and political threat. 
Ironically, the Afghanistan intervention, Iran-Iraq War, and Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait, while increasing threats to Saudi interests in the short-term, decreased 
them over the long-term. Rather than being undermined by these events, which 
certainly was a possible outcome at the outset of these conflicts, the Saudi position 
on the whole was bolstered. 
For its part, the Afghanistan intervention undermined Soviet policy in the 
Gulf, absorbed Moscow's human and material resources, and, thus decreased its 
ability to pressure the Saudis either directly or through its position in Ethiopia and 
the PDRY.5 The failure of the intervention also moved Moscow toward a more 
accommodating foreign policy at both the global and regional levels. Indeed, from 
1988 to 1992, Saudi-Soviet relations improved considerably, in part because of the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of East-West rivalry, but also as 
a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In what would have been unthinkable 
heretofore, the Saudis even went so far as to invite Soviet forces into their kingdom 
during the Iraqi crisis in 1990.6 While this was unsettling to some members of the 
America-led alliance against Iraq, and although Soviet forces did not take part in 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia did repeatedly express its 
appreciation for the Soviet political role during the crisis.7
Over the longer term, regional conflict also played a role in decreasing Iran's 
threat to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and many states outside the Persian Gulf feared 
an Iranian victor)' in the Iran-Iraq War, particularly after Iran's military victory in 
early 1986 at the strategic Faw Peninsula. But, in important ways, the war weakened 
and helped moderate Iran over the longer term. 
First, although the war fueled the fires of Islamic fundamentalism from 
which Khomeini's regime gained much of its legitimacy, Iran's political and 
military failures during the war also gave moderate elements in Iran a chance to 
advance their political agenda. By 1987, Iran became more concerned with 
consolidating and protecting the revolution within its own borders than with 
exporting Islam.8 If the war did unite Iranians behind the Ayatollah, it also betrayed 
the falsity of Khomeini's predictions of Iraqi defeat, and sowed the seeds of a more 
flexible Iranian foreign policy as evidenced, for instance, in Iran's effort to free 
Western hostages in Lebanon. 
Second, by arousing fear and focusing attention on Iran's revolution, the war 
made it more difficult for Khomeini to spread Islamic fundamentalism without 
provoking considerable alarm. Had Iraq not attacked Iran in 1980, Iran could have 
spread Islamic fundamentalism in a non-military and less provocative fashion9 
behind the tacit threat of its feared military hand. The war forced Iran to play this 
hand and to deplete its military arsenal. 
Third, the Iraqi crisis, while posing a serious threat to regional stability, also 
accelerated Iran's move toward a more moderate foreign policy. While the Iran-
Iraq war devastated Iran economically and gave it sufficient incentive to assume a 
more accommodating stance toward its neighbors and the West, the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait gave Iran's neighbors and the West more reason to value Iran's regional 
role. The invasion impressed upon the Saudis the importance of Iran's balancing 
role against Iraq, and gave Iran the opportunity to shore up its relations with Arab 
Gulf states, and to make the case that the real threat to the Gulf had always come 
from Iraq. 
In the post-Iraqi crisis period, Iran called for vastly increased economic and 
political cooperation with the West and closer ties to Arab Gulf states.10 This 
suggested, as did the waning of the Iranian revolution, that Iran could be in a position 
to play a more constructive regional role in the future. From Saudi Arabia's 
perspective, Iraq's continuing threat in the post-Gulf War period was added 
incentive for improving relations with Iran. Therefore, while both states remained 
competitive in the region, they also became more interested in some level of 
cooperation. It is not surprising then that Saudi-Iranian relations improved in the 
post-Gulf War period, despite the ongoing rivalry between the two states for 
influence in the Muslim world and over the politics of oil production and pricing. 
The improvement in relations was clearly evidenced by the major rise in diplomatic 
contacts and positive exchanges and interaction between the two states. 
While conflict helped decrease over time the threat to Saudi Arabia from the 
Soviet Union and Iran, it also diminished the Iraqi threat.   The Iran-Iraq War 
produced a military imbalance of power between Iraq and Iran and left Iraq 
economically supine, which were probably factors in Iraq's decision to invade 
Kuwait. To be sure, the invasion created serious tensions in Saudi relations with 
Jordan, Yemen, Iraq and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which may 
continue to prove troublesome for Saudi Arabia in the future. However, it also 
knocked Iraq out as the last major external threat to Saudi interests, in at least the 
near term. Whether or not Iraq will regain its previous military position remains to be 
seen. But even if it does, the Saudis will have had much time to improve their strategic 
position relative to that of Iraq. This should place some constraints on Iraqi foreign 
policy, which did not exist prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and should make the 
Saudi position in the late 1990s more stable than it would have been otherwise. 
The record suggests, then, that external threats to Saudi Arabia have 
diminished greatly since 1979. In the past, Saudi Arabia faced serious and at times 
simultaneous threats from Iran, Iraq and the USSR. By contrast, in the post-Gulf 
War period, Iran moderated its foreign policy, albeit still flexing its muscles on 
occasion; and Iraq, while still belligerent, was seriously weakened militarily. 
Moscow, for its part, was relegated virtually to the sidelines of the Persian Gulf 
political-security landscape, for the first time since the Shah was in power in Iran. 
While it continued to remain active politically, Russia was much less of a serious 
threat to Saudi interests than it had been before. 
THE DECREASE IN INTERNAL THREATS TO SAUDI SECURITY 
The United States as well as other actors that support the status quo in the 
Persian Gulf have been concerned not only with external threats to Saudi interests 
but also with the possibility that the Saudi regime would be overthrown by 
discontented internal elements. Indeed, the Reagan Doctrine was issued in part to 
emphasize America' s commitment to protect Saudi stability against internal threats.'' 
The Iranian Revolution initially increased the internal threat to Saudi 
stability, particularly from the Saudi Shiite Muslims, but the Iran-Iraq War and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the whole helped decrease it. The Iranian Revolution 
put forces in motion that bedeviled Saudi-Iranian relations. Saudi Arabia's 
monarchical form of government, pro-Western tilt, Sunni leadership, and conserva-
tive outlook clashed with Iran's post-revolutionary clerical rule, anti-Western bent, 
Shiite leadership, and revisionist foreign policy. 
Two notable efforts were made to undermine Saudi authority in 1979. The 
first was the seizure of the Grand Mosque, Islam's holiest shrine at Mecca, by 
several hundred armed Muslim zealots in November 1979. With outside assistance, 
the Saudi National Guard successfully suppressed these zealots. But Saudi Arabia 
was concerned enough over the Mecca fallout to agree to a set of resolutions 
condemning America for its role at Camp David, in the hope that this would bolster 
its credentials in the Muslim world.I2 The Mecca incident further cast Saudi stability 
and its role as a pillar of Western security in the Persian Gulf into doubt. 
Eight days after the seizure of the Grand Mosque, while the Saudi National 
Guard was still battling the zealots at Mecca, disturbances erupted in Saudi Arabia's 
oil-rich eastern province. They constituted the first political challenge posed by the 
Shiites to the Sunni Saudi regime and were viewed as serious enough by the royal 
family to prompt the dispatch of 20,000 troops to the area.11
Internal threats to the kingdom continued in the 1980s. In 1987, the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca was disrupted by a riot touched off when Saudi security units 
moved in to stop a forbidden political demonstration by Iranian pilgrims in front of 
the Grand Mosque. Despite considerable evidence to the contrary,14 Iran's 
President Hashemi Rafsanjani denied that it instigated the subversion, asserted 
that the Saudis were to blame, and called on Iranians as "the implementers of 
divine principles" to overthrow the Saudi royal family in revenge." This caused 
alarm across the Persian Gulf and in certain Western quarters. 
Iran, which competed with Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic world, 
wanted to destabilize Saudi Arabia and challenge its rule over Islam's holy places. 
Later, Iran also wished to retaliate against the Saudi's American ally for reflagging 
Kuwaiti tankers during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War.16 However, it was the 
Mecca crisis that pushed the Saudis to sever relations with Iran and nearly put the 
two states in military conflict.17
Ironically, the crisis helped strengthen the Saudi position, because some Arab 
Gulf states, which otherwise were riding the fence between Iran and the Saudis,18 
moved closer to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it legitimized US-Saudi security 
cooperation, and pushed the Saudis to appease discontented internal elements. These 
actions, as well as the slow waning of the Iranian Revolution, help explain why 
internal threats to Saudi interests decreased from 1979 to 1994. Iran increasingly lost 
the ability and will to generate domestic instability in Saudi Arabia. 
Desert Storm, for its part, produced countervailing effects on Saudi political 
stability. At one level it contributed to and helped generate movements, secular and 
religious, that challenged aspects of Saudi royal family rule. In December 1990, King 
Fahd received a "Secular Petition" from 43 religious and secular leaders, which was 
followed three months later by 'The Religious Petition" from scores of top religious 
leaders.19 The ultra-conservative religious forces expressed their strong concern over 
royal family corruption, nepotism, and monopoly control over decision making. For 
their part, liberal democratic forces pushed for democratic reforms. 
At the same time, however, the royal family took measures to appease its 
critics. It issued the royal decrees, calling for a Consultative Council of commoners 
nominated by the King, adherence to the rule of law and an enlarged body of princes 
to select a new monarch. King Fahd linked these measures directly to the Persian 
Gulf war, and described them as a "kind of partnership between the grassroots and 
the leadership."20 The debate over reforms was not particularly divisive; King Fahd 
was widely viewed as the legitimate arbiter. However, in some Saudi quarters, the 
reforms were perceived as devoid of content in that they did not "presage any 
political reform or bring any change to the method of government."21
To be sure, the royal measures fell far short of meaningful reform, and did 
not reflect any serious intention on the part of the regime to cede power. Nor did 
they represent a Saudi embrace of Western democracy or any variant thereof. 
Indeed, King Fahd stated that the "democratic systems prevailing in the world are 
systems which in their structure do not suit this region and our people," and that "the 
system of free election is not part of Islamic ideology."22 However, pressures for 
political change continued to be felt, as reflected by the regime's decision in the 
winter of 1993 to disband what it viewed to be a nucleus of a reform-minded political 
party, and by the arrest in September 1994 of a group of Islamists who were pushing 
for radical reforms. 
Nonetheless, the reforms did represent some modest concessions to Saudi 
democratic forces. While these forces had been pushing for more democratic 
institutions prior to the Iranian Revolution, their efforts gained momentum only 
after Iraq's eviction from Kuwait.23 Conservative forces in the Kingdom also gained 
from the decrees. While the royal measures did not accommodate their desire for 
strict imposition of Islamic laws, they did accommodate their demands for greater 
decision making participation and for such things as regulations to eliminate 
corruption.24 In this sense the reforms contributed to Saudi domestic stability by 
at least charting a potential path for more meaningful reform and by helping lower 
the level of domestic discontent. Political pressure for political reform will 
undoubtedly continue, but, unlike in the past, the Saudis need not be as concerned 
that such forces will have strong backing from Iran. 
IMPROVEMENT IN US-SAUDI RELATIONS 
While Saudi power is related to Saudi military capability and to the level of 
internal and external threat that the Saudi regime faces, it is also fundamentally 
linked to the nature of US-Saudi relations. All other things being equal, the better 
these relations, the more powerful is the Saudi position. This is because American 
support enhances Riyadh's ability to bring about desirable foreign policy outcomes, 
and as the recent 1990-91 Gulf War demonstrated, may even be critical to Saudi 
survival as a sovereign state. 
Whereas US-Saudi relations were stable throughout the early and mid-
1970s, for a number of reasons they weakened in 1978-79. First, the Saudis opposed 
the US-sponsored Camp David accords. Washington had expected at least some 
Saudi support, but the anti-American regional pressures discussed earlier in the 
article raised the costs of association with Washington for Riyadh. 
Second, the United States was viewed by Gulf states as unable to stop Soviet 
gains in the PDRY, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan and to prevent the Shah of Iran's 
downfall, and thus lost credibility in many quarters in the Middle East.25 Although 
some members of the Saudi family continued to stress that US-Saudi relations 
remained strong,26 strains in US-Saudi relations were aggravated by a Saudi loss of 
confidence in the United States and by American doubts about Saudi stability in 
1979, following the domestic challenges to Saudi rule.27
The Afghanistan intervention and the Iran-Iraq War clearly produced 
consequences which reversed this trend. The intervention in Muslim Afghanistan 
undermined Moscow's attempts to woo Saudi Arabia, which had previously 
appeared to have borne some fruit, and made Saudi Arabia more important 
strategically to Washington.28 For its part, the Iran-Iraq War impeded Iran's efforts 
to undermine Saudi influence and made America strategically more important to 
Saudi Arabia. This dichotomy of mutual interests was the foundation on which US-
Saudi relations improved throughout the 1980s. This improvement was unmistak-
able and had major implications for Saudi power. 
In 1981, America sold Airborne Warning and Air Control System (A W ACs) 
capability and other equipment to the Saudis in an air-defense enhancement 
package.29 While America's interest in the AW ACs sale, as implied by several US 
officials,3" was related more to the Soviet threat, the Saudi interest in cooperating 
with America was motivated more by the Iranian threat. The AW ACs sale enhanced 
US-Saudi trust and cooperation. 
Other war-related developments also improved US-Saudi cooperation. The 
Saudis, for instance, built huge underground strategic facilities,31 which were 
intended to support a massive American deployment in the event of a major Iranian 
or Soviet threat. Ironically, they were used not against Iran or Moscow but against 
Iraq in 1990. Thus, the Iranian threat had pushed Saudi Arabia to cooperate more 
closely with America in security areas. While this might have been expected, given 
the fact that America was protecting Saudi interests, the Saudis heretofore had 
succeeded in manipulating the American connection to suit their fluctuating 
security needs.32 For its part, Washington also responded favorably to Saudi 
requests for American arms and military backup support against real and perceived 
threats from Iran.33 Though problems in US-Saudi relations did not disappear, the 
cooperation catalyzed by the Iran-Iraq War contrasted starkly with the less than 
cooperative relations that existed prior to it. 
The 1990-91 Gulf crisis motivated the highest level of US-Saudi cooperation 
to date. It made clear to the Saudis that their security ultimately rested with the United 
States. In this sense the Gulf crisis may very well have represented a culmination of 
a trend in Saudi foreign policy away from accommodation of anti-American regional 
actors and toward a more assertive defense policy in conjunction with American 
backing. While Saudi Arabia will continue to employ a mix of accommodation and 
assertion in its foreign policy, this mix will probably tend to lean more toward the latter 
approach, in which US-Saudi relations will figure prominently. 
SAUDI MILITARY CAPABILITY ENHANCED 
The improvement in US-Saudi relations was accompanied by an 
enhancement of Saudi military capability. While in some regions of the world, 
military capability has become less important as an indicator of power, this is not 
true of the Persian Gulf, where the potential for the threat or use of force is higher 
than in most other regions. 
Saudi military capability increased substantially from 1978-79 to 1994, in 
direct response to regional conflict. Although Riyadh was building its military even 
before the Iranian Revolution, regional conflict pushed it to accelerate and diversify 
this effort. Conflict also made the United States more willing to contribute to the 
development of Saudi capabilities. For example, Saudi acquisition of American 
AWACs capability and its development of major command, naval and defense 
facilities represented quantum leaps in military sophistication. Riyadh also 
developed its own armed forces and engaged in military maneuvers and cooperation 
with America and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.34 Such efforts 
continued after Desert Storm, albeit at a slow pace, spurred by the failure of 
indigenous regional collective security efforts. 
In the post-war period, Arab states sought to develop a form of collective 
security under the so-called Damascus Declaration. This declaration, issued on 6 
March 1991, called for strategic collaboration between the GCC states, Egypt and 
Syria.35 In exchange for security support in the form of Egyptian and Syrian military 
contingents permanently stationed in the Gulf region, the GCC states would provide 
much needed capital for the Syrian and Egyptian economies. 
While initially successful, this collective security effort faced several major 
obstacles. The Gulf states thought that Egypt and Syria sought to get maximum 
remuneration for minimal military support, while Egypt and Syria believed that 
Gulf states wanted maximum security for minimal money. After initially 
supporting the security plan, the Saudis questioned the logic of hosting foreign 
forces on their soil. The last time the Egyptians were involved on the peninsula, in 
the 1960s, the Saudis had called on American forces to deter them from 
challenging Saudi interests. The Saudis also feared that Arab states might become 
involved in royal family politics, thus undermining the regime, and that added 
financial burdens would strain an already stretched budget. Egypt increasingly 
became annoyed with Saudi procrastination in implementing the accord, and by 
early May, decided to follow in Syria's footsteps by withdrawing its 40,000 troops 
from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.36 That represented the death knell for the 
Damascus Declaration. 
At the same time, efforts to develop a major joint GCC military force also 
proved problematic. The failure of such GCC efforts and of the Damascus 
Declaration pushed the Saudis to attempt to develop their own military forces 
through arms procurement, increases in army size, and military training exercises. 
The Gulf crisis clearly contributed to Saudi King Fahd' s interest in purchasing billions 
of dollars of additional sophisticated weaponry, and in attempting to enlarge the Saudi 
army and to improve its combat readiness.37 By June 1991, Riyadh aimed, for perhaps 
the first time, to supplement its sophisticated air-defense system with a mobile, large-
scale army and took steps to increase the size of its military by 1992.38
While Saudi military efforts increased Saudi power to some extent, they must 
be kept in perspective. The Saudis still lacked the requisite skills and manpower to 
utilize effectively their large inventory of sophisticated weapons. In addition, the 
Saudi arms build-up has added to the regional arms race between Riyadh, Baghdad, 
and Teheran. Although as history shows, Iran and Iraq would engage in an arms race 
regardless of Saudi military policy, the Saudi build-up adds to their interest in 
developing their capabilities. Finally, the Saudi build-up raises questions about 
Israeli security. Although the Middle East is flirting with some form of peace, Saudi 
military development and acquisition of sophisticated technology has been 
significant enough to complicate Israeli defense planning, and may prove 
troublesome in the future should the peace process fail. 
Overall, however, an intelligent arms acquisition policy on the part of the 
Saudis, which in particular builds Riyadh's defensive capabilities but avoids 
degrading Israel's military edge, can benefit American and regional security. This 
is because it will strengthen Riyadh relative to Iran and Iraq, the two actors that pose 
the greatest threat to Persian Gulf stability. While efforts aimed at developing a 
large Saudi military force have been launched in the past without avail, the recent 
crisis and Saddam's continuing presence in Iraq might serve as a sufficient reminder 
of the importance of such efforts this time around. 
WAR AND THE SAUDI ECONOMY 
Prior to trie Iran-Iraq War, the Saudi economic position was quite strong, 
despite the rigors of the modernization process. The Iran-Iraq War, however, 
imposed serious costs on Riyadh. The Saudis loaned Iraq billions of dollars to fend 
off the Iranians, loans which were not repaid. In addition, from 1983 to 1991, Saudi 
imports of goods and services exceeded the value of exports by approximately $ 120 
billion.39 Moreover, the Saudis ran eleven consecutive years of budget deficits from 
1983 to 1994.40
However, while the Iran-Iraq War was costly, Desert Shield and Storm 
produced much more serious economic dislocation. Although King Fahd described 
the Saudi economic situation as stronger than ever in the post-Gulf War period,41 the 
1990-91 conflict imposed severe opportunity costs on the Saudis. While it is true 
that Saudi oil income in 1991 was over $40 billion dollars due to windfall profits 
from increased prices and production related to the Gulf crisis, Saudi war expenses 
were estimated at $60-70 billion.42 Riyadh's financial woes were further 
exacerbated by a downturn in the global economy; budgetary problems even 
pushed the Saudis to stretch out payments for billions of dollars of American-made 
weapons.43
War, thus, weakened the Saudi economy and in this sense weakened Saudi 
power. However, it should be noted that the impact of war on the Saudi economy, 
while not insigificant, is unlikely to be long-term. The regime retained the ability 
to restore economic vitality through huge oil reserves, some of which were newly 
found, and through substantial foreign investments. In addition, Saudi foreign debt 
has not been particularly high. This allows the Saudis greater financial flexibility. 
Furthermore, as already noted, the Saudis offset some war costs by capitalizing on 
the increase in oil prices created by the UN-imposed economic embargo of Iraqi oil. 
In terms of power, Riyadh's main competitors in the region, Iraq and Iran, were far 
more seriously undermined economically. Given that "power" is largely a relative 
concept, the impact of war on those economies is also important to bear in mind 
when assessing Saudi power. 
SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY: CONFLICT AND CHANGE 
Developments in the 1980s, which were discussed earlier in this article, 
altered the nature of Saudi foreign and domestic policy and enhanced Saudi power. 
The Saudis became more adept at protecting and advancing their interests. This can 
be seen by examining changes in Saudi foreign policy over time. 
Prior to the Iran-Iraq War. the Saudis tended to be cautious in foreign policy. 
On the whole, they preferred to accommodate regional and international aggressors 
rather than to oppose them. This strategy tended to make sense because in the period 
of 1978-79, the Saudis faced potentially serious internal and external threats, were 
weak militarily, had strained relations with the United States, and lacked significant 
experience in confronting adversaries. Thus, they were not in a position to assume 
an assertive foreign policy, or in other words, a policy based much more on 
challenging other actors than on accommodating them for purposes of meeting 
foreign policy goals. It was preferable for the Saudis to accommodate real or 
perceived adversaries in order to avoid conflict. However, as the Iran-Iraq War 
progressed into the 1980s and as the political-strategic landscape began to change, 
Riyadh became more assertive. In part, this was because US-Saudi relations began 
to improve and Iran and Iraq increasingly became bogged down in the Iran-Iraq 
War. Increased Saudi assertiveness was demonstrated in several cases. 
Of all Muslim states, the Saudis and Iran took the strongest stance against 
Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan. Throughout the 1980s, Riyadh supported the 
Afghan rebels politically, economically and militarily, and, as already noted, 
refused to have meaningful relations with the USSR while it occupied Afghanistan. 
The Saudis also exhibited increased assertiveness during the Iran-Iraq War. 
In 1984, with American AWACs support, the Saudis successfully protected their 
airspace against Iranian aircraft. In 1987, in a similarly bold move, Riyadh 
effectively deterred an Iranian naval attack on its offshore oilfields.44 The Saudi 
response to the 1987 Mecca incident mentioned above also reflected an increasingly 
assertive policy. In the past, it would have been unimaginable for the Saudis to have 
taken such a strong political and military stance against Iran. In these cases, Saudi 
actions went well beyond self-defense and reflected increased confidence in 
challenging Iran. 
In the economic realm as well, the Saudis challenged Iran on oil pricing and 
production. They argued that some OPEC states, such as Iran, were producing oil 
beyond their quota. This created serious friction in Saudi-Iranian relations, and 
underscored the fact that the Saudis were willing to take political risks to advance 
their views on political and economic issues. 
The development of Saudi foreign policy in the 1980s had implications when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.  Saddam faced a more steadfast and experienced 
opponent in Riyadh than he had in the past. Presented with the choice of appeasing 
Saddam and counting on him not to invade Saudi Arabia on the one hand, or 
confronting Saddam and inviting his wrath, Riyadh chose the latter course. Saudi 
Defense Minister Prince Sultan even went so far as to say that Saudi Arabia had 
"military technologies capable of destroying the Iraqi army," and that Iraq knew the 
Saudis had the "power, will and determination capable of deterring it."45 Such a 
statement would not have been made in 1979. 
The increase in Saudi power, position and confidence carried over into the 
post-Gulf War period. This could be seen in apparent Saudi attempts to dominate 
smaller Gulf states such as Qatar. It could also be seen in Riyadh's unfortunate and 
ill-fated support of an anti-democratic, fundamentalist wing of Yemen's Islamic 
political party, al-isiah, in the Yemeni Civil War of 1994. 
Riyadh also assumed a more active and visible role in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, and pushed harder and more successfully to export conservative Saudi-
style Islam. Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, for instance, Saudi-Egyptian relations 
remained shaky, despite the Iran-Iraq War, which had generated increased coopera-
tion between the two states. The Gulf crisis proved a turning point in Saudi-
Egyptian relations. It brought the two states together against Iraq and helped 
improve their relations. In the post-war period, Egypt became more inclined to 
pursue Saudi-style Islam. In part this resulted from bilateral relations forged during 
the Gulf crisis. But it also reflected the wish of Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, 
to appease rising fundamentalist pressures in Egypt and to benefit from Riyadh's 
dollar diplomacy. The upshot is that Egypt took a number of actions aimed at 
bringing it closer in line with Islamic precepts, including an espousal by Mubarak 
that Egypt adopt Islamic law.46
CONCLUSIONS 
The 1990-91 Gulf crisis underscored the importance of Saudi Arabia to the 
industrialized world. Because it directly controls approximately 25 percent of the 
world's oil, Saudi Arabia will continue to be a country of vital importance in 
Western strategic policy in the post-Cold War world. 
The rise of Saudi power has important implications for the regional and 
international politics of the Persian Gulf. First, it suggests that Riyadh can play a 
bigger role in its future defense. This is because its military capability and its will 
to use it have increased, while the military capability of its regional competitors, and 
probably their will to use it, has decreased. But it is also because the Saudis have 
assumed a more visible and credible political profile in the region, despite the fact 
that they are resented by the less wealthy Arab states and are viewed in some 
quarters as American lackeys. 
That Saudi Arabia can play a bigger role in its future defense does not, 
however, mean that it can handle a major military attack by either Iran or Iraq, or 
that the United States need not be involved in the region. The Saudis lack the skills, 
experience, and manpower for such a task and clearly remain dependent on the 
United States for military support. But they can assume a greater role as part of a 
forward defense that can slow down regional aggressors and allow time for 
American reinforcement. 
Second, if Saudi Arabia is a key to Western security in the Persian Gulf and 
if the Saudi position has improved relative to that of its competitors, then in this 
respect the Persian Gulf is more stable than it has been in some time. This is true 
despite the continuing presence of Saddam Hussein, the Kurdish problem, the gap 
in the Middle East between rich and poor and between democratic and monarchical 
forces, and the regional arms race. Observers who argue that these factors reflect 
increased disorder in the Middle East in the post-Desert Storm period miss the point. 
A simple comparative analysis shows that many of these problems have existed for 
some time. Thus, they do not in themselves reflect an increase in regional 
instability. 
Third, the increase in Saudi power underscores just how costly the use of 
force was to Iraq and Iran. It not only hurt them in human and material terms, but 
also decreased their power relative to that of Saudi Arabia, a state which they sought 
to dominate politically. The rise of Saudi power represents an ongoing cost to Iraq 
and Iran because both actors remain interested in regional dominance. And a 
stronger Saudi Arabia is more likely to thwart their future regional ambitions than 
a weaker one. 
On that note, the Saudis managed to emerge from regional conflict less 
damaged than the two countries which could most threaten them—Iraq and Iran. 
At a general level, this helps explain the rise of Saudi Arabia from 1978 to 1994. 
This is particularly true given that, in the Middle East more than in less 
conflictual regions, power is measured in relative terms. While absolute growth 
in power is important, which Saudi Arabia has shown, relative growth is much 
more critical. This is not only because the Saudis compete primarily with Iran 
and Iraq for influence in the Persian Gulf region, but also because in the Middle 
East a current ally can more easily become a future adversary than in most other 
regions of the world. 
 
Steve Yetiv is an assistant professor of political science at Old Dominion University 
and a research affiliate at Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies. 
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